

25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

TOP SECRET

COMOR-D-72

25X1  
25X1A

17 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Status of Overhead  
Photographic Reconnaissance

1. Attached for discussion with COMOR on Thursday, 18 June, is a draft monthly status report which was originally suggested as an aid to the Director of Central Intelligence by the Deputy to the Director for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation. The present version has been revised from a draft presented to the DCI on 18 May and subsequently approved by him as to format and content. At the same time he approved the concept of preparing this once a month for the advice of the members of the Board. Our plan is to prepare this for COMOR approval approximately the third Thursday of each month so that it may be forwarded to USIB for its information on the last Wednesday. The timing is planned so that members of USIB and the USIB consultants may have this in their hands prior to the 303 Committee meeting which concerns itself with approval of photographic reconnaissance schedules.

2. The package attached lacks two or three writeups but these are comparatively short and they will be available to you on Thursday. It also lacks maps which in the loose-leaf form in which this report was given to the Director, faced the section on targeting.

for James Q. Reber  
Chairman

Attachment: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance  
Subject paper

Copies 2, 3 State TCO  
4 DIA (Col. [redacted])  
5 DIA (Maj. [redacted])  
6, 7, 8, 9 DIA TCO  
10 OACSI TCO  
11, 12 ONI TCO  
13, 14, 15, 16 AFNIN TCO  
17, 18 NSA TCO  
19, 20 NRO TCO

Copy 18 of 53

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

NRO review(s)  
completed.

TOP SECRET

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and declassification

25X1A

25X1A

25X1  
25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

COMOR-D-72

Status of Overhead Photographic Reconnaissance

1. For the information of the Chairman, USIB, pages 6 through 24 are status reports on manned and satellite reconnaissance activities, broken down according to area or country as follows:

Pages 6 to 7 Cuba  
Pages 8 to 9 Middle East  
Pages 10 to 11 Sino-Indian Border  
Pages 12 to 16 China  
Pages 17 to 18 North Korea  
Pages 19 to 21 Southeast Asia

Pages 22 to 24 USSR and European Satellites  
Not included World Geodetic Datum

2. Each section contains the following:

- a. A brief summary of the Board's action in establishing requirements for overhead photographic reconnaissance, either manned or satellite.
- b. 303 Committee approvals and comments.
- c. COMOR actions taken in pursuance of outstanding instructions or as the result of recent activity.
- d. A summary of targets in the area, showing priority and distribution. A map is included where appropriate.

TOP SECRET

25X1A  
25X1A

25X1

e. A report on activity stating date of most recent coverage, extent to which requirements are being met, and comments on factors militating against meeting requirements.

3. In the case of manned reconnaissance COMOR establishes priority targets for operational planning and designates secondary targets which are to be covered insofar as it is feasible without detriment to the priority targets.

4. Satellite Reconnaissance targeting priorities are set up as follows:

25X1D


KH-4

Extraordinary - Camera turned on each time over target during mission regardless of weather or altitude of pass. Minimum sun angle to be specified when targets are selected.

Priority 1 - Camera turned on over target at least once per mission even if weather or altitude are unfavorable.

Priority 2 - Point targets in Sino-Soviet Bloc and holidays\* prior to January 1963 in the USSR.

Priority 3 - Point targets in North Korea and prior to Jan 1963 in China, North Korea and European Satellites.



25X1A

25X1A

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

COMOR-D-72

In addition, for the KH-4 and in the following order of priority, additional areas are programmed but to be used on a film available basis after Priority 3 above.

a. Middle East

c. Sino-Indian Border  
d. Congo  
e. Indonesia  
f. Cuba

\*Holidays are gaps in useable photographic coverage. Areas of the USSR are designated holidays when the available photography fails to meet one of the following criteria: (a) less than 50 per cent cloud-cover, June 1962 to the present, or (b) less than 50 per cent cloud-cover, January 1963 to the present. The criteria for China are that the areas must be essentially cloud free and adequately illuminated, and only photography acquired since 1 July 1963 is considered.

5. As a routine matter, as soon as any mission is completed, whether manned or satellite, COMOR reviews its targeting as it may have been affected by the mission in question and includes for consideration any pertinent collateral information. In summary, this process calls for:

a. Deletion of targets not requiring coverage either because the requirement has been fully satisfied or its existence has been negated.

b. Reduction in priority of targets that do not need immediate recoverage but cannot be dropped.

TOP SECRET

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

TOP SECRET

25X1

COMOR-D-72

- c. Addition of new targets.
- d. Increase, when necessary, in  
priority of existing targets.

In addition to study of the information derived from a specific mission and all collateral intelligence, careful consideration is given to the collection capabilities of collateral sources vis-a-vis overhead photographic reconnaissance. Furthermore, and particularly with regard to satellite reconnaissance, any new facts revealed about the collection capability of a system results in a world-wide review of all overhead photographic reconnaissance targets to ensure that optimum use of a specific capability is made in covering various types of targets.

6. As a regular matter COMOR will, after receiving the preliminary report of each mission, assess the results in the context of how adequately requirements are being met and will report to USIB. This report will include specific recommendations on future scheduling.

5

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

TOP SECRET

25X1A

25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

TOP SECRET

25X1

COMOR-D-72

C U B A

Board Action

1. On 2 April 1964<sup>a</sup> the Board approved:
  - a. Coverage of the Guantanamo area once every two weeks.
  - b. Coverage of about 90 per cent of the territory of Cuba with interpretable photography once every four weeks, the area not covered to be assessed and, if necessary, given priority the following four weeks.
  - c. Coverage of all highest priority targets with interpretable photography at least once every four weeks with coverage of about 50 per cent of the objectives in each category once every two weeks.
  - d. Special coverage of areas or objectives as determined by COMOR or higher authority.
  - e. In responding to these reconnaissance requirements, at least two flights per week will be conducted to ensure the collection of information through stimulation of air defense reaction.
  - f. COMOR to report monthly to the Board on the adequacy of coverage.

2. Subsequently on 13 April 1964<sup>b</sup> the Board approved use of 112A to cover areas most pertinent to reports on unidentified missile activity.

3. On 13 May 1964 the Board discussed further the question of the number of flights needed to accomplish the necessary coverage and directed COMOR to report to the Board every two weeks beginning

<sup>a</sup>USIB-D-41.14/122 (COMOR-D-24/127)

<sup>b</sup>USIB-D-41.14/127 (COMOR-D-24/130)

6

25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

TOP SECRET

25X1A

25X1  
25X1

25X1A

25X1A

Approved For Release

~~TOP SECRET~~

2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

COMOR-D-72

25X1

## CUBA Cont!

20 May<sup>a</sup> This report will advise the Board as to how SAC is fulfilling existing USIB requirements for high-altitude coverage of Cuba and what further guidance, if any, USIB should provide.

4. On 18 May 1964 vote slip approval of the COMOR proposal to use Mode II in GOLDEN TREE operations<sup>b</sup> was made final.

25X1

COMOR Action

6. Maintains a daily account of targets covered and changes targets daily to meet new situations. Also reports at specified periods to the Board on status of coverage and recommends missions to meet special problems and low-level photography if the situation demands.

Targeting

25X1D

7. There are ☐ targets in Cuba, ☐ of which are carried as highest priority, broken down as follows:

25X1D

25X1D

Report on Activity

8. During the first two weeks of June five GOLDEN TREE missions were flown and the USIB requirements were satisfactorily fulfilled. For the month preceding 14 June the cumulative coverage amounted to 88 per cent and all of the highest priority targets were covered at least once.

9. A preliminary review of the information obtained from the two 112A missions flown early in May and a reassessment of the intelligence needs resulted in a COMOR recommendation to recommend against further use of the 112A for the present.

<sup>a</sup>USIB-D-41.14/143 (COMOR-D-24/141)

<sup>b</sup>USIB-D-41.14/130 (COMOR-D-24/131) 7

25X1A  
25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

~~TOP SECRET~~25X1A  
25X1A

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

COMOR-D-72

MIDDLE EAST

Board Action

1. In March 1964<sup>a</sup> COMOR pointed out that, based upon the nature of the problems in the Middle East and upon the country-by-country review of the intelligence targets, it did not believe that there is a need for a long-range program calling for periodic coverage of the Middle East objectives by U-2 quality photography at this time.

303 Committee Action

3. None required.

COMOR Action

4.

b. Reviews targets after each mission.

c. Watches for critical situations requiring manned overflight reconnaissance.

Targeting

5. COMOR lists 76 U-2 targets in this area of which eight are missile sites, [redacted] 29 are military installations, and 30 are airfields.

<sup>a</sup>USIB-D-41, 14/119 (COMOR-D-10/17), 27 March 1964  
<sup>b</sup>SC-01868/1-64-T/K, [redacted] no date

TOP SECRET



25X1D

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

25X1A

25X1A

COMOR-D-72

25X1

## SINO-INDIAN BORDER

### Board Action

1. On 6 January 1964<sup>a</sup> the Board approved the COMOR statement of the long-range requirements for the Sino-Indian border for guidance of Operations as well as for COMOR in the preparation of its targeting for specific operations in that area. Specifically, the Board approved quarterly coverage of the Sino-Indian border with the missions to be flown to coincide with the most favorable periods for launch of offensive operations.

2. On 26 February 1964<sup>b</sup> the Board considered a re-evaluation of needed U-2 coverage of the Far East which specified that certain areas should be covered as soon as possible. The Sino-Indian border was in that list. The Board directed that COMOR should review Sino-Indian border targets, showing recommended priority of coverage. This was done and published on 12 March 1964.<sup>c</sup>

25X1D

25X1D  
25X1

25X1D

### COMOR Action

### Targeting

5. The Sino-Indian border area includes 41 targets over a 1,500-mile area from the NEFA to the southwest corner of Sinkiang Province. These include eight airfields and 28 other military installations. Two of the airfields are targeted for KH-4 photography.

<sup>a</sup>USIB-D-41.14/93 (COMOR-D-25/66), 6 January 1964

<sup>b</sup>USIB-D-41.14/108 (COMOR-D-25/77), 26 February 1964

<sup>c</sup>USIB-D-41.14/115 (COMOR-D-25/83), 12 March 1964

25X1A

25X1A


25X1A

TOP SECRET

25X1  
25X1

TOP SECRET


Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8



COMOR-D-72

SINO-INDIAN BORDER Cont'

Report on Activity



TOP SECRET

25X1D

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

COMOR-D-72

## NORTH KOREA

### Board Action

1. On 6 January 1964<sup>a</sup> the Board approved coverage with U-2 photography to keep abreast of the introduction of high-performance aircraft and of Air Force and Naval Order of Battle.

### 303 Committee Action

### COMOR Action

b. Updates target file on the basis of immediate readout of [ ] and satellite reconnaissance missions, collateral reports, and when special situations arise.

### Targeting

4. The total [ ] targets includes 13 airfields and six other military installations.

### Report on Activity

5. There has been no U-2 mission over North Korea since October 1963. There were a total of five U-2 missions over North Korea during 1963.

<sup>a</sup>USIB-D-41.14/93 (COMOR-D-25/66), 6 January 1964

TOP SECRET

25X1D

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

25X1A

25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

TOP SECRET

COMOR-D-72

25X1

## SOUTHEAST ASIA

Board Action

1. The long-range program<sup>a</sup> of December 1963, dealt only with Laos, not South Vietnam and Cambodia. Coverage every two months to monitor road and rail nets, construction projects, supply depots, and major airfields was approved by the Board.<sup>b</sup>

2. On 24 February 1964<sup>c</sup> the Board approved:

a. Comprehensive coverage of South Vietnam in connection with the strategic hamlet program.

b. The preparation of a study (including an engineering analysis of the capability of the pertinent roads) from available photography of the road nets of concern, any important gaps to be identified for coverage in the near future.

c. As near as possible daily coverage of roads and logistic routes from North Vietnam to South Vietnam through Laos and Cambodia, the results to be the subject of continuing analysis by MACV and the Washington intelligence community to determine whether the data acquired are of sufficient value to warrant continuation or modification of the program.

d. Pre- and post-strike reconnaissance of 34A targets.

3. On 15 April,<sup>d</sup> to meet the crisis in Southeast Asia, the Board approved COMOR proposals as given below<sup>e</sup> but added that a review should be made in the near future.

<sup>a</sup>USIB-D-41.14/91 (COMOR-D-25/65), 30 December 1963

<sup>b</sup>USIB-D-41.14/93 (COMOR-D-25/66), 6 January 1964

<sup>c</sup>USIB-D-41.14/107 (COMOR-D-25/75), 24 February 1964

<sup>d</sup>USIB-D-41.14/128 (COMOR-D-25/88), 15 April 1964

<sup>e</sup>USIB-D-41.14/125 (COMOR-D-25/86), 10 April 1964

19

25X1A

25X1A

25X1  
25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

TOP SECRET

25X1A

25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

TOP SECRET

COMOR-D-72

25X1

### SOUTHEAST ASIA (Contd)

a. The photographic hamlet program coverage is now 75 per cent completed and should be finished.

b. That coverage of 34A targets appears to be well along in terms of establishing base line coverage and there would remain only MACV asking for pre- or post-strike coverage as appropriate.

c. Critical roads in southern Laos (12, 12A, 12B, 8, 9, 23) should be covered daily as near as possible until an assessment.

d. That IDEALIST should fly no further missions at this time over North Vietnam and Laos unless CIA receives an appropriate request.

25X1

5. On 20 May<sup>b</sup> the Board approved the conclusions contained in COMOR's comments on an analysis made of truck traffic patterns in North Vietnam and the Communist-held portions of Laos.<sup>c</sup> Taking into account weather and other operational factors which were discussed at the Board, the recommendations would call for near daily U-2 photography of routes 7, 12, 12A, 12/AB, 12B, 9, and 23.

6. 20 LUCKY DRAGON missions were approved for the period 1 - 30 June with the statement that these are tentative numbers depending on weather and satisfaction of stated requirements. As noted in para 5 above, this could conceivably be closer to 30 than 20.

<sup>a</sup>USIB-D-41.14/136 (COMOR-D-25/91), 1 May 1964

<sup>b</sup>USIB-D-41.14/148 (COMOR-D-25/99), 20 May 1964

<sup>c</sup>USIB-D-41.14/147 (COMOR-D-25/98), 19 May 1964

25X1A

25X1  
25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

TOP SECRET

25X1A



25X1A

25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

TOP SECRET

25X1

COMOR-D-72

COMOR Action

7. a. Maintains a list of targets for monitoring purposes.
- b. Transmits to SAC through DIA targets for specific coverage as they are notified to COMOR.

Targeting

8. The targets in Cambodia, Laos, and North and South Vietnam are selected largely by MACV and CINCPAC for acquisition of tactical intelligence. The breakdown of targets in Southeast Asia are as follows:

Airfields	137
Military Installations	256
Road Surveillance	90
Border Surveillance	37
Other	50
Total	570

Report on Activity

25X1A

9. Between 18 May and 14 June approximately 122 [ ] and 17 LUCKY DRAGON missions were flown to collect tactical intelligence on this area. Aircraft supporting this operation were shot down on 6 and 7 June.

25X1A

25X1A

21

25X1  
25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

TOP SECRET

25X1A  
25X1

25X1A

25X1A

TOP SECRET  
Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8  
COMOR-D-72

25X1

## USSR AND EUROPEAN SATELLITES

### Board Action

1. On 8 May<sup>a</sup> the Board directed the firing of two Js per month with a backup of six spares at all times. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] At this time the Board also emphasized the need for priority coverage of China. A plan to achieve the China coverage was worked out between COMOR and NRO.<sup>b</sup> The need for the accelerated schedule was again emphasized at the Board on 21 May<sup>c</sup> when the importance of satellite reconnaissance to the timely production of National Intelligence Estimates was emphasized.

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1  
NRO

25X1D

### COMOR Action

[REDACTED]

### Targeting

4. The KH-4 satellites designed for large area coverage are programmed for [REDACTED] targets, [REDACTED] are targeted for the USSR and European satellites. In addition to installations and search area targets, the KH-4 is programmed to insure periodic coverage of all areas in the USSR and satellite countries.

25X1D

25X1D

<sup>a</sup>USIB-D-41.15/34 (COMOR-D-48/68), 4 May 1964

<sup>b</sup>USIB-D-41.14/144 (COMOR-D-48/71), 14 May 1964

<sup>c</sup>USIB-D-41.15/36 (COMOR-D-48/72), 21 May 1964

25X1A

25X1A

25X1

25X1

25X1D

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A002600010006-8